mirror of https://seed.radicle.dev/rad:z4D5UCArafTzTQpDZNQRuqswh3ury.git synced 2026-10-18 19:10:45 +08:00

Files

T

Daniel NormanandRūdolfs Ošiņš f90db0986a Warn about releases and artifacts by others

- Add an UntrustedWarning banner
- Warn on the Others releases list
- Warn on a release by a non-delegate
- Warn on artifacts by non-delegates on a delegate release
- Warn in the download popover for a non-delegate artifact
- Add E2E tests for both release cases

Co-authored-by: Rūdolfs Ošiņš <rudolfs@osins.org>

2026-10-08 18:21:48 +02:00

3.5 KiB

Raw Blame History

4. Untrusted releases and artifacts

Date: 2026-10-06

Status

Proposed

Context

Releases and their artifacts are COBs, so anyone can create a release in a repo they replicate, and anyone can register an artifact on any release, including a delegate's. An artifact is a file a user downloads and may run. A release that sits in a well-known repo gets some of that repo's trust in the eyes of a user who doesn't know what a delegate is. This makes it easy to trick a user into downloading something malicious.

Trust is set at two levels:

Release: its creator decides the title, tag and commit.
Artifact: its author decides the bytes behind the CID.

The two can differ. A delegate's release can carry an artifact a non-delegate registered, and a delegate can register an artifact on a non-delegate's release.

The app, like radicle-explorer, splits releases and artifacts into two disjoint scopes by author: Delegates and Others. In the code the scopes are trusted and untrusted. The discussion is in the Artifacts topic on Zulip.

Decision

Trust follows delegates. A release or artifact is trusted when its creator or author is a delegate of the repo, and untrusted otherwise. The UI keeps the labels Delegates and Others, as "Untrusted" reads as too alarming for content that is often harmless.

Warn where untrusted content shows. A short warning (UntrustedWarning.svelte) says the content is not from a delegate and to download it only if the user trusts its author. It stays small, so it informs without alarm. It shows:

above the Others releases list;
on a release by a non-delegate, for the whole release;
on a delegate's release, while it shows artifacts by non-delegates;
in the download popover of an artifact by a non-delegate, whatever the release, because that is where the user acts;
in the browser tab of a delegate's artifact, while it lists links added by non-delegates, as those downloads are not checked against the CID.

Count only delegate attestations. The attestation badge on an artifact counts delegates only, as anyone can make keys that attest their own artifact. The full list still shows every attestation.

Keep untrusted content visible. Others' releases and artifacts stay listed by default, behind their own filter.

Alternatives considered

Hide Others by default, behind a global setting. This protects users best, and avoids showing links to malware at all, which is a reputation risk a warning doesn't remove. It also hides legitimate contributions, such as builds by a release manager who is not a delegate. It is still open.
Rename Delegates to Official or Others to Untrusted. This changes only the wording and leaves the warning to a single label.
A list of trusted publishers in the repo identity, like canonical ref rules. This lets non-delegates publish trusted releases, but adds a second trust model. Linking a release to a canonical annotated tag gives part of this already, so canonical refs are the preferred path.

Consequences

Users see a warning before they download an untrusted artifact, also when it sits on a trusted release.
A trusted artifact on an untrusted release still shows the release warning, as its title, tag and commit are not trusted.
Delegation is the only trust signal. Release managers who are not delegates show as Others until releases can use canonical ref rules.
radicle-explorer should show the same warnings so that both clients agree.

3.5 KiB Raw Blame History