mirror of
https://seed.radicle.dev/rad:z3trNYnLWS11cJWC6BbxDs5niGo82.git
synced 2026-10-18 19:10:39 +08:00
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---
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RIP: 2
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Title: Identity
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Author: '@cloudhead <cloudhead@radicle.xyz>'
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Status: Draft
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Created: 2022-12-06
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License: CC0-1.0
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---
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RIP #2: Identity
|
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================
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In RIP #1, we discussed *repository identity*, and the *identity document*.
|
||||
We said that to make it possible for repositories to be hosted in a peer-to-peer
|
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network, Git repositories on their own are not enough: we need a secure way to
|
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identify repositories that goes beyond source code. We need a stable identifier
|
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and a mechanism for self-certifying repositories against this identifier,
|
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so that changes to source code can be verified locally, by users.
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In this RIP, we discuss the method through which we can achieve the above in
|
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a secure, decentralized way.
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Table of Contents
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-----------------
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* [Overview](#overview)
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* [Peer Identity](#peer-identity)
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* [Repository Identity](#repository-identity)
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* [Validation](#validation)
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* [The Repository Identifier](#the-repository-identifier)
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* [Identity Storage](#identity-storage)
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* [Verification](#verification)
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* [Security](#security)
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* [Closing Thoughts](#closing-thoughts)
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* [Credits](#credits)
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* [Copyright](#copyright)
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Overview
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--------
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To introduce the topic of identity, we point the reader to the opening
|
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paragraphs of the original specification of identities on the Radicle network,
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which is still very much applicable to the Heartwood protocol:
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> In order to collaborate on repositories within a consensus-free network, we
|
||||
> must be able to refer to them using a stable identifier. Note that this
|
||||
> identifier is a statement of intent: a repository can be described as a
|
||||
> collection of ever-moving leaves of a DAG whose root element is the empty
|
||||
> object. Therefore, the content of a repository is not enough to describe it –
|
||||
> while two views on the repository may share objects, they may diverge
|
||||
> substantially otherwise. Both views may however state their intent to
|
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> eventually converge to the same state.
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>
|
||||
> While in principle a random identifier with sufficient entropy would suffice
|
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> for the purpose, this would put the burden of deciding which repository views
|
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> are legitimate entirely on the user. Instead, our approach is to establish an
|
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> ownership proof, tied to the network identity of a peer, or set of peers,
|
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> such that repository views can be replicated according to the trust
|
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> relationships between peers (“tracking”).
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||||
>
|
||||
> Our model is loosely based on The Update Framework (TUF)[^0], conceived as a
|
||||
> means of securely distributing software packages.
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|
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With this in mind, there are three core components to the Radicle identity
|
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system, for any given repository:
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1. A set of peers on the network, each holding a signing key.
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2. A document which establishes the identity of this repository, using these
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signing keys to self-certify.
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3. A stable identifier that can be used to refer to the repository, derived
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from this document.
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|
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Peer Identity
|
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-------------
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Since Radicle repositories on the network are created by peers, we must first
|
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establish the concept of a *peer identity*. In Heartwood, peers are simply
|
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identified by their public key. This key is an Ed25519[^1] key that is encoded
|
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as a DID using the `did:key` method[^2]. DIDs are used for interoperability
|
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with other systems as well as allowing for other types of identifiers in the
|
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future.
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|
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did:key:z6MknSLrJoTcukLrE435hVNQT4JUhbvWLX4kUzqkEStBU8Vi
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|
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*Example of a peer identifier in DID format.*
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|
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We'll also note that peers on the network -- also called *nodes* are
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indistinguishable from *users* at the protocol level. The terms "Node ID",
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"Peer ID", "Public Key" are thus all used interchangeably.
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|
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Repository Identity
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-------------------
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With the establishment of peer identities, we can now move on to repository
|
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identities. A repository identity consists of an identity document and an
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associated unique identifier.
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The identity document is a JSON document associated with a repository on Radicle.
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The *hypothetical* minimal identity document looks like this:
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{ "delegates": ["did:key:z6MknSLrJoTcukLrE435hVNQT4JUhbvWLX4kUzqkEStBU8Vi"],
|
||||
"threshold": 1 }
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|
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It describes a repository with a single *delegate*. Delegates are trusted
|
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entities that can cryptographically sign data within the scope of a given
|
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repository. In the identity document, they are represented by a DID. As of this
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RIP, only the `did:key` method is supported.
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Using the `threshold` property, the document specifies that only *one* delegate
|
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is required to sign updates to the repository. In this case, since we only
|
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have one delegate, this is the only possible value for `threshold`.
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|
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> Repository delegates are responsible for signing all updates to a repository,
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> whether it be source code commits or updates to the identity document itself.
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> They can be thought of as repository "maintainers", though the applicability
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> is broader. We will see how delegates sign repository updates in one of
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> the following sections.
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|
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Though the above document could constitute a valid identity, it does not contain
|
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any identifiable data that may be used to describe a particular repository.
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This is what the `payload` section is for. Heartwood defines a single payload
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type, `xyz.radicle.project`, which can be used to describe a project stored
|
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in a repository:
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|
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{ "delegates": ["did:key:z6MknSLrJoTcukLrE435hVNQT4JUhbvWLX4kUzqkEStBU8Vi"],
|
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"threshold": 1,
|
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"payload": {
|
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"xyz.radicle.project": {
|
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"name": "heartwood",
|
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"description": "Radicle Heartwood Protocol & Stack",
|
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"defaultBranch": "master"
|
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}
|
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}
|
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}
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|
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The string `xyz.radicle.project` is called a *payload ID*, and the `project`
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payload is the default payload type for Radicle repositories. Using this payload,
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type, a repository may be given a name, a description, and a default branch.
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|
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Identity documents are designed to be extensible, and developers may create
|
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their own payload types and applications can choose which payload types to
|
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support.
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|
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{ ...
|
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"payload": {
|
||||
"xyz.radicle.project": { ... },
|
||||
"xyz.radicle.funding": { ... },
|
||||
"com.atproto.account": {
|
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"email": "eve@atproto.com",
|
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"handle": "eve"
|
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}
|
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}
|
||||
}
|
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|
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<small>Figure 1. Fictional example of an identity with multiple payloads</small>
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|
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Payload IDs use reverse domain-name notation[^3] and are comprised of two
|
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parts: an *authority*, eg. `radicle.xyz`, and a *name*, eg. `project`. To keep
|
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payload types globally unique, developers wishing to create new payload types
|
||||
must control the authority (domain) under which these live.
|
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|
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As of this RIP, there is only one recognized payload type: `xyz.radicle.project`.
|
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Repositories which include this type of payload are sometimes called *projects*.
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|
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> When specifying new payload types, it's worth thinking about how the payload
|
||||
> schema might evolve over time. For example, it might be worth versioning the
|
||||
> payload types, either via the identifier (eg. `com.atproto.account.v1`) or
|
||||
> via a field inside the payload (eg. `{"version": 1}`). This will ensure that
|
||||
> changes to the payload schema are able to be made in a backwards compatible
|
||||
> way.
|
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|
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### Validation
|
||||
|
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An identity document is valid if the following conditions are met:
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||||
|
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* There is at least *one* `delegate`, but no more than `255`.
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* Strings are not empty, and at most `255` characters long.
|
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* The `threshold` is not zero and not greater than the number of `delegates`.
|
||||
* The items in `delegates` are valid DIDs.
|
||||
* There is a `payload` property with at least one payload object and a valid
|
||||
payload ID.
|
||||
* Each payload under `payload` is valid according to the rules of that payload.
|
||||
|
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These rules can be partly described in the following JSON Schema[^4] document:
|
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|
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{
|
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"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
|
||||
"type": "object",
|
||||
"properties": {
|
||||
"delegates": {
|
||||
"type": "array",
|
||||
"items": [{ "type": "string" }],
|
||||
"minItems": 1,
|
||||
"maxItems": 255,
|
||||
"uniqueItems": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
"threshold": {
|
||||
"type": "integer",
|
||||
"minimum": 1,
|
||||
"maximum": 255
|
||||
},
|
||||
"payload": {
|
||||
"type": "object",
|
||||
"additionalProperties": { "type": "object" },
|
||||
"minProperties": 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"required": ["delegates", "threshold", "payload"]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Finally, the schema and validation rules for the `xyz.radicle.project` payload
|
||||
are described as:
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
|
||||
"type": "object",
|
||||
"properties": {
|
||||
"name": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
"minLength": 1,
|
||||
"maxLength": 255
|
||||
},
|
||||
"description": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
"maxLength": 255
|
||||
},
|
||||
"defaultBranch": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
"minLength": 1,
|
||||
"maxLength": 255
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"required": ["name", "description", "defaultBranch"]
|
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}
|
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|
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The Repository Identifier
|
||||
-------------------------
|
||||
Now that we have a document describing our repository, we can derive from it
|
||||
a unique identifier that can be used to refer to the repository on the
|
||||
peer-to-peer network. This identifier must meet certain criteria:
|
||||
|
||||
1. It must be *stable*, in other words it must not change throughout the
|
||||
lifetime of the repository.
|
||||
2. It must be deterministically derivable from the identity document alone, for
|
||||
the purpose of verification.
|
||||
3. It must contain enough entropy to be globally unique.
|
||||
4. It must allow for easy retrieval of the document from storage.
|
||||
|
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To fulfill the above, and given that Radicle uses Git for storage of repository
|
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data, we choose to use the *Git Object ID*[^5] of the identity document, as
|
||||
identifier. Git object IDs, or *OIDs* are "hardened" SHA-1 checksums of their
|
||||
content, prefixed with a short header. We can compute this OID using the `git
|
||||
hash-object` command. But before doing so, we must take care of one last thing:
|
||||
to make the process of hashing our identity document fully deterministic, we
|
||||
must first ensure our document is in canonical JSON form[^6]. This prevents
|
||||
things like whitespace or key ordering from influencing the document hash and
|
||||
therefore the identifier. In turn, this makes the identifier easier to compute
|
||||
correctly.
|
||||
|
||||
The above document in canonical form looks like this:
|
||||
|
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{"delegates":["did:key:z6MknSLrJoTcukLrE435hVNQT4JUhbvWLX4kUzqkEStBU8Vi"],
|
||||
"payload":{"xyz.radicle.project":{"defaultBranch":"master","description":
|
||||
"Radicle Heartwood Protocol & Stack","name":"heartwood"}},"threshold":1}
|
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|
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We can now compute the Git object ID by placing the above JSON in a file, eg.
|
||||
`radicle.json`, taking care to strip all newline characters from it, and
|
||||
running the following command:
|
||||
|
||||
$ git hash-object -t blob radicle.json
|
||||
|
||||
The output should be:
|
||||
|
||||
d96f425412c9f8ad5d9a9a05c9831d0728e2338d
|
||||
|
||||
This SHA-1 hash is the document's OID. To turn it into a Radicle repository
|
||||
identifer, we encode the underlying 20-byte hash value using `multibase`
|
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encoding[^7] with the `base-58-btc` alphabet; the same encoding used for the
|
||||
`did:key` method, and prefix `rad:` to it, making it a valid URN:
|
||||
|
||||
"rad" ":" multibase(base58-btc, raw-oid-bytes)
|
||||
|
||||
This results in the repository identifier, or RID:
|
||||
|
||||
rad:z42hL2jL4XNk6K8oHQaSWfMgCL7ji
|
||||
|
||||
This RID is theoretically unique thanks to the entropy provided by the delegate
|
||||
key and payload.
|
||||
|
||||
Identity Storage
|
||||
----------------
|
||||
A storage system suitable for storing identity documents must have two
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
|
||||
1. It must guarantee data integrity.
|
||||
2. It must preserve the history of changes to the documents.
|
||||
|
||||
Radicle repositories are stored in Git, and criteria (1) is guaranteed by Git
|
||||
natively, so long as we store our identity documents in the Git object database.
|
||||
This is because Git hashes all objects under it, and structures its data such
|
||||
that a change in hash of one object means a change in hash of all dependent
|
||||
objects.
|
||||
|
||||
Criteria (2) can be guaranteed by encoding changes to the documents as a Git
|
||||
commit history. Not only does a commit history allow us to preserve all changes,
|
||||
it also proves, via hash-linking that no change was omitted from the history.
|
||||
|
||||
Commit Commit Commit
|
||||
┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐
|
||||
│ fb8e40a │◄─┐ │ c581f25 │◄─┐ │ 43eb12d │
|
||||
│ │ └─┤ fb8e40a │ └─┤ c581f25 │
|
||||
│ ┌──────────┐│ │ ┌──────────┐│ │ ┌──────────┐│
|
||||
│ │ Document ││ │ │ Document ││ │ │ Document ││
|
||||
│ ├──────────┤│ │ ├──────────┤│ │ ├──────────┤│
|
||||
└─┴──────────┴┘ └─┴──────────┴┘ └─┴──────────┴┘
|
||||
|
||||
In the above diagram, we see three commits, with the left-most being the *root*
|
||||
commit of the document, ie. the initial state, and the right-most being the
|
||||
*head*, ie. the latest state.
|
||||
|
||||
Each commit includes within its Git tree, a blob named `radicle.json` which
|
||||
contains a version of the identity document.
|
||||
|
||||
┌───────┬─────────┐ ┌─────┬───────────┐
|
||||
│commit │ fb8e40a │ ┌─────┬────────────────────┐ ┌►│blob │ d96f425 │
|
||||
├───────┴─────────┤ ┌►│tree │ 82bc09a │ │ ├─────┴───────────┤
|
||||
│tree 82bc09a ├─┘ ├─────┴────────────────────┤ │ │{"delegates":...,│
|
||||
│author ... │ │blob d96f425 radicle.json ├──┘ │ "payload":..., │
|
||||
│ │ └──────────────────────────┘ │ "threshold":...}│
|
||||
└─────────────────┘ └─────────────────┘
|
||||
|
||||
Using this representation, we can hence track all changes to a given identity.
|
||||
To keep track of the head of this history, we use a special Git reference
|
||||
named `rad/id` which points to the latest version of the identity document:
|
||||
|
||||
fb8e40a ◄─ c581f25 ◄─ 43eb12d ◄─ refs/rad/id
|
||||
|
||||
Just like regular Git branches, when the identity is updated, `refs/rad/id`
|
||||
is reset to point to the latest commit. Note that this commit history is
|
||||
completely separate from the source code history pointed to by eg.
|
||||
`refs/heads/master` and other branches. The identity history is kept in
|
||||
the repository's *stored copy*, which is a bare repository, and is not included
|
||||
in working copies.
|
||||
|
||||
### Verification
|
||||
|
||||
Verifying the latest state, ie. commit `43eb12d` is a matter of verifying all
|
||||
preceding states, starting from the root (`fb8e40a`).
|
||||
|
||||
The root commit is verifiable intrinsically, since it contains as part of its
|
||||
Git tree, the document from which we derived the RID. We can see above that the
|
||||
original blob from which we computed the repository identifier is contained in
|
||||
the tree pointed to by the root commit of the document history. The root commit
|
||||
is hence valid for a given RID if and only if it contains a blob under the name
|
||||
`radicle.json` containing a valid identity document which hashes to the given
|
||||
RID, *and* the commit is signed by all delegates in the initial `delegates` list.
|
||||
|
||||
Once the root commit is verified, we can proceed to the next commit. Since
|
||||
the document may have changed in this commit, the RID is no longer useful for
|
||||
verifying this commit. Instead, we make sure that two conditions are fulfilled:
|
||||
|
||||
1. The commit containing the updated document is signed by a number of keys
|
||||
greater than or equal to the `threshold` property of the *previous*, valid
|
||||
version of the document.
|
||||
2. Each of the aforementioned signatures belongs to a key that is part of the
|
||||
`delegates` set of the previous document version.
|
||||
|
||||
> Git commit signatures can be verified with the `git verify-commit` tool.
|
||||
|
||||
These delegate signatures are expected to be included in the commit header
|
||||
under the `gpgsig` key, and be encoded in the SSH signature format.
|
||||
|
||||
tree c66cc435f83ed0fba90ed4500e9b4b96e9bd001b
|
||||
parent af06ad645133f580a87895353508053c5de60716
|
||||
author Buck Mulligan <buck@mulligan.xyz> 1664467633 +0200
|
||||
committer Buck Mulligan <buck@mulligan.xyz> 1664786099 -0200
|
||||
gpgsig -----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
|
||||
U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgvjrQogRxxLjzzWns8+mKJAGzEX
|
||||
4fm2ALoN7pyvD2ttQAAAADZ2l0AAAAAAAAAAZzaGE1MTIAAABTAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5
|
||||
AAAAQIQvhIewOgGfnXLgR5Qe1ZEr2vjekYXTdOfNWICi6ZiosgfZnIqV0enCPC4arVqQg+
|
||||
GPp0HqxaB911OnSAr6bwU=
|
||||
-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
|
||||
gpgsig -----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
|
||||
U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgDb3ulFKnHALG8AnuuFPY9prvVZ
|
||||
kyLc73tcQ+HG3sCzQAAAADZ2l0AAAAAAAAAAZzaGE1MTIAAABTAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5
|
||||
AAAAQM9rxErTt7AtcLypSyVM/jmd9/syO4D5hjMjL/9lbGzIkXXDL6+QlUsLipeLuYHV92
|
||||
F/6nm/lEaPUTeiZQ5o9AI=
|
||||
-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
|
||||
|
||||
<small>A Git commit header with two SSH signatures.</small>
|
||||
|
||||
We proceed in this manner until the last commit in the history. If all commits
|
||||
pass this verification process, we consider the identity valid. Note that every
|
||||
version of the document must be validated according to the rules stated under
|
||||
the [Validation](#validation) section. This includes the document payload,
|
||||
and implies that application developers supporting payload extensions will
|
||||
have to provide their own validation for these payloads, that will have to run
|
||||
for each commit in the document history.
|
||||
|
||||
It's important to restate that for any commit `C`, other than the root commit,
|
||||
verification is done by using the `delegates` and `threshold` values of the
|
||||
*parent* commit to `C`, which has already been verified.
|
||||
|
||||
Security
|
||||
--------
|
||||
The combination of Git storage and cryptographic verification provides very
|
||||
strong security and integrity guarantees around Radicle repositories and
|
||||
identities:
|
||||
|
||||
* Omitted data up to the latest commit is detected by Git itself
|
||||
* Tampering with the identity root will result in a different RID
|
||||
* Adding a delegate key without the sign-off of the existing delegate set will
|
||||
fail verification
|
||||
|
||||
There is one possible attack that can be carried out by network participants:
|
||||
serving old data. Since it isn't possible to know whether a document history
|
||||
has a more recent update than the latest known update, a dishonest peer may
|
||||
choose to hide the last *N* identity updates from its peers. This means it
|
||||
will serve a stale document to its peers.
|
||||
|
||||
However, this attack is only effective if *all* of a victim's connected peers
|
||||
perform this censorship. It takes only one honest peer to serve the full
|
||||
document history for the censorship to fail.
|
||||
|
||||
Closing Thoughts
|
||||
----------------
|
||||
In this RIP we described an identity system for Git repositories that can be
|
||||
used to securely distribute code on a peer-to-peer network. The system is
|
||||
self-certifying and requires only basic Git primitives to implement.
|
||||
|
||||
Credits
|
||||
-------
|
||||
* Kim Altintop, for the original design this system is based on
|
||||
|
||||
Copyright
|
||||
---------
|
||||
This document is licensed under the Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal license.
|
||||
|
||||
[^0]: https://theupdateframework.github.io/specification/latest/
|
||||
[^1]: https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/
|
||||
[^2]: https://w3c-ccg.github.io/did-method-key/
|
||||
[^3]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_domain_name_notation
|
||||
[^4]: https://json-schema.org/
|
||||
[^5]: https://git-scm.com/book/en/v2/Git-Internals-Git-Objects
|
||||
[^6]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8785
|
||||
[^7]: https://w3c-ccg.github.io/multibase/
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user