Introduces a new COB type to store repository identity documents.
The reason for this change is to:
1. Simplify the code, as the identity document logic resembled a COB,
yet it had custom logic. This allows existing COB code to be used for
identities.
2. Make identity document update logic more flexible, since COB actions
can be added in the future.
3. Re-purpose existing tools around COBs to work on identities, eg. `rad
cob`.
4. Unify the concept of an identity change proposal, with regular identity
changes. This means we can remove the `id.proposal` COB in favor of
using the `id` COB itself.
Notes
-----
* Each repository has one Identity COB.
* The `Proposal` COB has been repurposed into the `Identity` COB.
* Identity documents are stored as *embeds* inside the Identity COB
actions.
* The action that contains new document versions is called `revision`,
just like the Patches COB.
* The namespaced `rad/id` ref is a symbolic reference to that Identity
COB.
* The canonical `rad/id` ref is a direct reference to the commit in the
Identity COB that contains the latest *accepted* revision of the
document.
* All commands for managing identities have been folded into `rad id`.
Hence `rad delegate` and `rad edit` are removed.
* The concept of "rebasing" an identity document is gone.
* The `rad id` output has been updated to match the style of other
commands.
* When a revision has enough signatures, it is automatically adopted as
the current identity, there is no longer the need for a "commit"
action.
* When an identity revision is proposed, and the current identity has a
threshold of `1`, that identity is automatically accepted due to the
above point.
* The idea of "verifying a peer's identity branch" no longer applies, as
COBs cannot be verified one history at a time.
* Since the root commit of the Identity COB does not have a "Resource"
to point to (it would have to point to itself, which is impossible),
we've made the resource id optional for COBs.
Updates transitive dependencies
Fixes zod vulnerability
> Zod version 3.22.2 allows an attacker to perform a denial of service while validating emails.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Martinez <me@sebastinez.dev>
This commit introduces the `FileStats` struct, that adds the insertions
and deletions for each file to `DiffContent`.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Martinez <me@sebastinez.dev>
This can have multiple reasons, interface has added a new property but
httpds haven't updated yet.
Other issues with some specific endpoints that return a 500 and we can't
load it.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Martinez <me@sebastinez.dev>
- This commit doesn't change the way syntax highlighting is done.
- But due to changes in `radicle-httpd` we can highlight the entire
files of a changeset, and then replace the plain text lines with
highlighted ones.
- Also highlights only the files currently visible of a changeset.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Martinez <me@sebastinez.dev>
Due to us moving to Radicle, we need to implement the following changes.
- We don't need the CI to run on pull_requests anymore.
- We want the CI to run on any push.
- For visual tests we don't want to update any comments and just fail
the test and upload the artifacts for checking.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Martinez <me@sebastinez.dev>
This fixes the issue with rendering code blocks without a blank line
between text and the start of a codeblock that starts with a `$`
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Martinez <me@sebastinez.dev>
We were just using `strip_prefix` with a hardcoded value, which wasn't
able to adjust to URIs that start with `data:image/png` or other content
and types.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Martinez <me@sebastinez.dev>
libgit2 optimizes around not loading the content, when there's no
content callbacks configured.
So we aren't able to get a clear answer from radicle-surf if a file in a
diff is a binary or not.
A simple way without doing additional API requests is to check if the
file type is a executable and if there are no hunks (since we don't get
any deltas in binaries), this is a strong
indicator for a binary.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Martinez <me@sebastinez.dev>
The issue seems to have been linked to the fact that we triggers incorrect refresh
through fsEvents. Even tough there are no changes on the local file system,
it requests full reload after 1-2 min.
Disabling fsEvents in the vite.config.ts prevents this to happen and per extension,
avoid the problem.
source: https://stackoverflow.com/a/75238360
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Martinez <me@sebastinez.dev>
Private repos are implemented by extending the identity document with a
`visibility` attribute, that can either be `"public"` (default) or
`"private"`.
In case of `private` visibility, only the delegates are allowed to view
the repo, as well as any DIDs added to the allow list.
To implement repo visibility, we simply block fetches from and
announcements to peers for whom the repo should remain invisible.
Private repos are also not announced in the `inventory` message, since
the full list of peers that *may* have the repo is retrievable from the
repo identity. This could cause errors if eg. a peer who is allowed to
view the repo doesn't actually have it. However this is an ok trade-off
for now to keep the complexity low. For repos to truly be private, it's
important that the RIDs don't leak either.
Finally, we modify `radicle-httpd` for now to only list public repos.
Eventually, we would want to change this depending on whether an allowed
peer is authenticated with the service or not.
---
It's also worth mentioning why this approach was taken, vs. end-to-end
encryption. The reasons are as follows:
1. Nodes that do not have access to a private repo will generally not want to
replicate encrypted data that they cannot examine or use.
2. The chosen solution is trivial, while encrypting git objects isn't.
3. Performance of the chosen solution is much better, there is no
overhead.
4. Privacy of the chosen solution is better: RIDs are never leaked, and
neither is the existence of a private repo, nor who has access to it.
There is one downside: Paying for storage of private repos is no better
in terms of privacy than what GitHub offers. Hosting providers will have
access to your private repos, if this solution is used.